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Abstract
The dominant formulation for modeling the objective function of managers of competing rms
with horizontal shareholding has been critiqued for producing the result that, if non-horizontal
shareholders are highly dispersed, managers would mimic the interests of horizontal sharehold-
ers even if they own a share of the rm that does not induce full control. We show that this
issue can be avoided (while maintaining the remaining features of the dominant approach)
with an alternative formulation that is derived from a probabilistic voting model that assumes
shareholders with higher nancial stakes will take greater interest in the managerial actions,
which yields the result that managers maximize a control-weighted sum of the shareholders
relative returns.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Horizontal shareholding is common ownership in competing rms. Such horizontal sharehold-
ing can induce a conict in the rm-specic objectives of shareholders, wherein horizontal
shareholders in any given rm want that rm to pursue a less competitive strategy than
the strategy desired by non-horizontal shareholders.1 Hence, rm managers must weigh the
conicting objectives of di¤erent shareholders according to their relative inuence over rm
decision-making.
Schmalz (2018) discusses the desirable properties for the weighting scheme used by man-
agers: (i) absent horizontal shareholding, managers would maximize their rms own prot;
(ii) with horizontal shareholding, managers would internalize the impact of their rms strat-
egy on rival rm prots when their rms controlling shareholders have nancial rights in the
rival; (iii) the weight that managers assign to rival rms would be continuous on the nancial
and control rights of the rms shareholders; (iv) managers would maximize industry prot
when all controlling shareholders are fully diversied across rivals; and (v) the weight that
managers assign to rival rm prots would reect relatively more the interests of relatively
large shareholders. Gramlich and Grundl (2017), OBrien and Waehrer (2017) and Crawford
et al. (2018) discuss an additional property: (vi) the weight that managers assign to rival
rm prots would not mimic the interests of horizontal shareholders when they own a share
of the rm that, even if non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, does not induce
full control.
The dominant formulation of the objective function of managers is due to OBrien and
Salop (2000, henceforth O&S), who incorporating features from both Rotemberg (1984) and
Bresnahan and Salop (1986), assume the manager would decide the strategy of the rm to
maximize a control-weighted sum of the rms shareholders returns. Because those returns
are a function of the prots of the rms in which shareholders hold nancial rights, this
implies that the manager of any rm j would maximize a weighted sum of the prots of
(potentially) all the rms in the industry:
max
xj
X
k2
kjRk =
X
k2
kj
X
g2=
kgg

/ max
xj
j +
X
g2=;g 6=j
P
k2 kjkgP
k2 kjkj
g; (1)
where  and = denote the set of existing shareholders and rms, respectively, xj denotes the
strategy of rm j, kj denotes the control rights of shareholder k in rm j, Rk =
P
g2= kgg
1Although non-horizontal shareholders may favor a di¤erent rm-specic strategy, that does not mean
they are harmed by horizontal shareholding because horizontal shareholding also reduces the competitiveness
of rival rms, and non-horizontal shareholders benet from a mutual reduction of competition at both the
rm and its rivals.
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denotes the returns of shareholder k, kj denotes the nancial rights of shareholder k in rm
j, and j denotes the operating prot of rm j. Azar (2016, 2017) shows that this formulation
can be microfounded through a probabilistic voting model in which shareholders elect one
of two potential managers, which yields that the control rights of each shareholder will (a)
if managers maximize their vote share, be proportional to their voting rights (proportional
control) and (b) if managers maximize their odds of election, equal the odds that their vote
will be pivotal in the election (i.e, by their Banzhaf (1965) power index).2 ;3
However, some critique the dominant formulation for failing property (vi).4 See Gramlich
and Grundl (2017), OBrien and Waehrer (2017) and Crawford et al. (2018). In this paper,
we propose an alternative formulation. In the lines of Azar (2016, 2017) and Brito et al.
(2018), we use a probabilistic voting model. But unlike prior literature, we assume that
managers expect shareholders with higher nancial stakes in their rm will (for example)
incur more e¤ort to become informed on the vote and thus could potentially have a larger
preference for (or against) the challenger than other shareholders. Then, in equilibrium, the
manager chooses the strategy of the rm to maximize a control-weighted sum of the rms
shareholders relative returns:
max
xj
X
k2j
kj ~Rk =
X
k2j
kj
X
g2=
kg
kj
g

= j +
X
g2=;g 6=j
X
k2j
kjkg
kj
g; (2)
where j denotes the subset of shareholders who hold nancial rights in rm j, ~Rk denotes
the relative returns of shareholder k, normalized by her nancial rights in rm j. The
intuition is as follows. The strategy proposals of the candidates impact the return of the
rms shareholders, which in turn impacts their probability of voting for the candidates.
The assumption above implies that the latter impact is lower for shareholders with higher
nancial stakes since, having a larger preference for (or against) the challenger, they already
have a larger probability of voting in one direction. As a consequence, candidates pay less
attention to those shareholders than they would under the dominant formulation. They do
so, by weighting not the absolute, but the relative returns of shareholders.5
Our proposed alternative formulation is similar in nature to the formulation in Crawford
2Azar (2017) also considers a probabilistic voting model in which shareholders vote either on whether to
approve a manager-proposed change in the rms strategic plan.
3Brito et al. (2018) generalize Azar (2016, 2017)s framework to jointly capture common-ownership and
cross-ownership by rival rms.
4In fact, as we show below, property (v) may - in certain cases - also fail under the dominant formulation.
5This means that if a shareholder owns a portfolio that is equal to another shareholders portfolio
multiplied by , the manager will consider they both have the same relative returns. Their control rights
will naturally be di¤erent, but their relative returns will be the same. This makes the smaller shareholder
more relevant in the managers objective function because in the dominant formulation, this shareholder
would have smaller control rights and also smaller absolute returns.
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et al. (2018) who, to address property (vi), normalize shareholder ks returns by
P
h2= kh,
but we microfound our function through a probabilistic voting model. This alternative
formulation can satisfy the six desirable properties discussed above.
2 An Illustrative Example
We now address an illustrative example, borrowed from Gramlich and Grundl (2017), to
examine how the two formulations compare in terms of properties (i) to (vi). Imagine a
duopoly in which one shareholder holds symmetric nancial and voting rights in both rms
and each of the remaining shareholders holds equal nancial and voting rights in solely
one rm. In this setting, properties (i) to (iv) clearly hold in both formulations. Online
Appendix A examines properties (v) and (vi), which we now discuss.
If we combine O&Ss formulation with an assumption of proportional control, property
(v) holds. The weight that managers assign to rival rm prots increases when the relative
size of the horizontal shareholder stakes increase (due to either higher levels of horizontal
shareholding or higher number of non-horizontal shareholders). However, this combination
also predicts that managers would engage in near-monopoly pricing when the non-horizontal
shareholders are highly dispersed, even if the horizontal shareholder does not have full con-
trol, which fails property (vi). Likewise, if we combine O&Ss formulation with an assumption
of Banzhaf control, property (v) holds for increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a
constant number of shareholders, but may or may not hold for a constant level of horizontal
shareholding with an increasing number of shareholders, since the number of subsets in which
the horizontal shareholder is pivotal can decrease as the number of non-horizontal sharehold-
ers increase. However, again, property (vi) does not hold. Table 1, Panel A illustrates these
features.
If we combine our proposed alternative formulation with an assumption of proportional
control, property (v) holds for increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a constant
number of shareholders, but not for a constant level of horizontal shareholding with an
increasing number of shareholders. The reason being that - in our example - the weight
that the manager of each rm assigns to the prot of the rival rm is solely given by the
control rights of the horizontal shareholder, since her nancial rights in the two rms exactly
cancel. However, this combination does not predict that managers would engage in near-
monopoly pricing when the non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, even if the
horizontal shareholder does not have full control. It thus satises property (vi). Likewise, if
we combine our formulation with an assumption of Banzhaf control, property (v) holds for
increasing levels of horizontal shareholding with a constant number of shareholders, but may
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or may not hold for a constant level of horizontal shareholding with an increasing number of
shareholders (for the same reasons as discussed above). However, property (vi) holds. Table
1, Panel B illustrates these features.
3 The Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework is based in Azar (2016, 2017) and Brito et al. (2018). There are
K shareholders, indexed by k 2  and N rms, indexed by j 2 =. The holdings of total
stock of shareholder k in rm j, represented by 0  kj  1 with
P
k2 kj = 1, capture her
nancial rights to the rms stream of prots. The holdings of voting stock of shareholder
k in rm j, represented by 0  kj  1 with
P
k2 kj = 1, capture her voting rights in the
rm that may not coincide with her control rights in the rm, which refer to the rights to
inuence the rms decisions in a way discussed below.
We follow Azar (2016, 2017) in assuming a standard theory of probabilistic voting. We
also assume, along Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), that the manager of each rm is the winner
in an election between two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, who compete for the
shareholdersvotes by proposing a strategy for the rm. Shareholders and candidates are
assumed to play a two-stage game. First, candidates simultaneously choose their strategy
proposals (e.g., quantity, price, etc.). Second, shareholders vote to elect their managers.
We assume the following regarding the voting behavior of shareholders:
Assumption 1 Shareholders are conditionally sincere.
Assumption 1 implies, following Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), that rm js shareholders
vote for the candidate whose strategy proposal maximizes their utilities, given the equilibrium
strategy proposals of the candidates to the remaining rms, randomizing between them when
indi¤erent.
We consider that the utility of shareholder k is a function of the winning strategies of all
rms and involves two elements, assumed additively separable, as follows:
uk = Rk +
X
g2=
dgkg =
X
g2=
kgg +
X
g2=
dgkg (3)
The rst utility element follows from O&S and captures the utility associated to the return
of shareholder ks nancial rights holdings. The second utility element follows from Kramer
(1983) and captures the utility associated to the credibility (or lack of credibility) attached
to the challengerstrategy proposal, where dg denotes a dummy variable that takes value 1
if the challenger is elected manager of rm g and kg denotes the utility that shareholder
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Table 1
Weight that each Manager Assigns to the Prot of the Rival Firm*
Number of Non-Horizontal Shareholders
1 100 499 500 501 1000
Panel A: O&Ss Formulation
1% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.000 0.010 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.093
(0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.052 0.296 0.312 0.296 0.597
(0 .000) (0 .051) (0 .077) (0 .082) (0 .077) (0 .128)
5% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.003 0.217 0.580 0.581 0.581 0.735
(0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.222 0.687 0.703 0.686 0.885
(0 .000) (0 .051) (0 .077) (0 .082) (0 .077) (0 .128)
10% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.012 0.552 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.925
(0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.650 0.986 0.985 0.986 1.000
(0 .000) (0 .143) (0 .564) (0 .534) (0 .560) (0 .950)
20% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.059 0.862 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.984
(0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0 .000) (0 .744) (1 .000) (1 .000) (1 .000) (1 .000)
Panel B: Proposed Alternative Formulation
1% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010) (0 .010)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.051 0.077 0.082 0.077 0.128
(0 .000) (0 .051) (0 .077) (0 .082) (0 .077) (0 .128)
5% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
(0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050) (0 .050)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.051 0.077 0.082 0.077 0.128
(0 .000) (0 .051) (0 .077) (0 .082) (0 .077) (0 .128)
10% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
(0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100) (0 .100)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.143 0.564 0.534 0.560 0.950
(0 .000) (0 .143) (0 .564) (0 .534) (0 .560) (0 .950)
20% Horizontal Shareholding
Proportional Control 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
(0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200) (0 .200)
Banzhaf Control 0.000 0.744 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0 .000) (0 .744) (1 .000) (1 .000) (1 .000) (1 .000)
* Please see Online Appendix A for the computational details. Control rights of the horizontal shareholder in
parenthesis. The weights in Panel B exactly coincide with the control rights of the horizontal shareholder since -
in our example - her nancial rights in the two rms exactly cancel.
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k obtains from such event. This implies that the shareholders choice is deterministic and
it is a discontinuous function of the di¤erence in the utilities obtained from the strategy
proposals of each candidate.
We follow Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in assuming that the utility associated to the
credibility of the challengerstrategy proposal, while known to voters, is unobserved by can-
didates, which treat it as a random utility shock independently distributed across rms and
shareholders according to a symmetric probability distribution with mean zero and cumula-
tive distribution Gkj ().6 Thus, from the candidatesperspective, voting by shareholders is
probabilistic.
We make the following alternative assumptions regarding the candidates objective func-
tion.
Assumption 2a Candidates choose strategy proposals to maximize their expected utility from
corporate o¢ ce.
Assumption 2b Candidates choose strategy proposals to maximize their vote share.
Additionally, we make the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 3 The strategy space of each rm j is a nonempty compact subset of <.
Assumption 4 The return of shareholder k is (a) continuous and twice di¤erentiable in
the rmsstrategies, with continuous second derivatives; and (b) strictly concave in rm js
strategy, conditional on the strategies of the remaining rms.
Assumption 5 The random utility kj is distributed uniformly on
  1
2
 jkj;
1
2
 jkj

.
The key, distinctive, technical assumption is Assumption 5. It implies that managers
expect that shareholders with higher nancial stakes in the rm will take more interest on
their actions and could therefore potentially have a larger preference towards or against the
challenger than other shareholders. This is consistent with a signicant literature that has
examined the incentives of large shareholders to undertake costly monitoring of the rm and
intervene to correct the managers suboptimal decisions (see, e.g., Chidambaran and John,
2003, and references therein). Finally, it implies also that the utility associated to a rm in
which a shareholder does not hold nancial stakes is null.
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
6This contrasts with Brito et al. (2018), who assume that random utility shocks are also identically
distributed across rms and shareholders.
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Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2a or 2b, 3, 4 and 5, there exists a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the candidates strategy proposalsgame where each candidate maximizes
max
xj
X
k2j
kj ~Rk (4)
Under Assumption 2a; kj is measured by the normalized Banzhaf ( 1965) power index of
shareholder k in rm j: kj = 
p
jk=
P
h2 
p
jh, where 
p
jk denotes the number of subsets of
shareholders that can award victory to a candidate in which shareholder k is pivotal. Under
assumption 2b, kj is measured by the voting rights of shareholder k in rm j: kj = kj.
Proof. See online appendix B.
Proposition 1 establishes that the manager decides the strategy of the rm to maximize
a weighted sum of the rms shareholders relative returns. The weights kj (that are non-
negative and sum up to one) capture the importance (or inuence) of each shareholder over
the decision-making of the rm and are a measure of her control in the rm. This implies
the manager maximizes a weighted sum of the prots of (potentially) all rms,
P
g2= ljgg,
where the weights ljg =
P
k2j kj(kg=kj) are non-negative.
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4 Conclusions
We propose an alternative formulation to model the objective function of the manager of a
rm in the presence of horizontal shareholding. In this alternative formulation, the manager
decides the strategy of the rm by maximizing a weighted sum of the rms shareholders
relative returns. We do not claim it to be preferred to O&Ss formulation. We solely propose
it as microfounded alternative which avoids an allegedly unattractive feature of the O&Ss
formulation: that if non-horizontal shareholders are highly dispersed, managers would mimic
the interests of horizontal shareholders even if they own a share of the rm that does not
induce full control. Future empirical testing might help establish which formulation more
accurately predicts rm behavior. This alternative formulation can be straightforwardly
incorporated into the generalized unilateral e¤ects screens proposed in Brito et al. (2018).
7With cross-ownership among rms, the corresponding weights would be ljg =
P
k2j 
u
kj(
u
kg=
u
kj),
where ukj and 
u
kj denote the ultimate nancial and control rights, respectively, of external shareholder k in
rm j, which can be computed following the algorithm in Brito et al. (2018).
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In this appendix, we examine properties (v ) and (vi ) of the managers objective function for the illustration example in the
main text. To do so, consider the horizontal shareholder holds x < 1 nancial and voting rights in both rms and that each
9
of the remaining n > (1   x)=x smaller shareholders holds equal nancial and voting rights in solely one rm. Let l denote
the Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder and s = (1   l)=n denote the Banzhaf power index of each of the
remaining non-horizontal shareholders.
The Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder l is obtained as follows. Consider initially those subsets of shareholders
that aggregate more than 50% of the voting rights and that do not include the horizontal shareholder. Each subset must include
z smaller non-horizontal shareholders such that z 1 x
n
> 1
2
which is equivalent to z 
j
n
2(1 x)
k
+1, where byc denotes the largest
integer lower than y. Any single smaller non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in one of these subsets if (z  1) 1 x
n
< 1
2
which is
equivalent to z 
j
n
2(1 x) + 1
k
.8 Therefore, any small non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in all subsets of z =
j
n
2(1 x) + 1
k
small shareholders in which she is present. There are Cnz =
n!
(n z)!z! di¤erent subsets with z smaller non-horizontal shareholders.
Therefore, the number of subsets that do not include the horizontal shareholder in which any small non-horizontal shareholder
is pivotal is Cn 1j
n
2(1 x)
k
+1 1
.
Consider now those subsets of shareholders that aggregate more than 50% of the voting rights and that include the horizontal
shareholder. Each subset must include z smaller non-horizontal shareholders such that z 1 x
n
+ x > 1
2
which is equivalent to
z 
j
( 1
2
  x) n
1 x
k
+ 1: Any single smaller non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal in one of these subsets if (z   1) 1 x
n
+ x < 1
2
which is equivalent to z 
j 
1
2
  x n
1 x + 1
k
. Therefore, any small shareholder is pivotal in all subsets that include the
horizontal shareholder and z =
j 
1
2
  x n
1 x + 1
k
small shareholders in which she is present. The number of subsets that
include the horizontal shareholder in which any small non-horizontal shareholder is pivotal is Cn 1j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k
+1 1
. In turn, the
horizontal shareholder is pivotal in those subsets that include her and z small non-horizontal shareholders if z 1 x
n
< 1
2
which
is equivalent to z 
j
n
2(1 x)
k
. Therefore, the horizontal shareholder is pivotal in all subsets that include her and z small
non-horizontal shareholders, with: 
(
1
2
  x) n
1  x

+ 1  z 

n
2(1  x)

; (5)
which implies the number of sets in which the horizontal shareholder is pivotal is:
j
n
2(1 x)
kX
y=
j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k
+1
Cny : (6)
Using the information above, by denition, the Banzhaf power index of the horizontal shareholder is:
l =
Pj n2(1 x) k
y=
j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k
+1
Cny
Pj n2(1 x) k
y=
j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k
+1
Cny + n
 
Cn 1j
n
2(1 x)
k + Cn 1j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k
! : (7)
Next, we discuss properties (v ) and (vi ) under the two formulations. To do so, we make use of the weight that each manager
assigns to the prot of the rival rm. It is straightforward to show that this weight is given by the expressions presented in
Table A1.
8
Please see Online App endix B for the formal denition of p ivotal.
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Table A1
Weight that each Manager Assigns to the Prot of the Rival Firm
O&Ss Proposed Alternative
Formulation Formulation
Proportional Control x
2
x2+(1 x)2=n x
Banzhaf Control lx
lx+(1 l)(1 x)=n l
Property (v).
In this setting, the relative size of the horizontal shareholder depends both on its absolute size and on the number of smaller
non-horizontal shareholders. In order to examine the impact of the relative size of the horizontal shareholder on the weight that
each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm, we examine how this weight is impacted by x and n, since that relative size
increases in x and n.
We begin by examining O&Ss formulation. Under proportional control, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot of
the rival rm is given by wpc = x
2
x2+(1 x)2=n , which increases in x and n:
@wpc
@x
= 2nx
(1  x)
(nx2   2x+ x2 + 1)2 > 0 (8)
@wpc
@n
= x2
(x  1)2
(nx2   2x+ x2 + 1)2 > 0:
This implies that property (v ) is present both if the number of shareholders is xed and if it is allowed to vary.
Under Banzhaf control, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm is given by wbc =
lx
lx+(1 l)(1 x)=n ,
which increases in x and n if:
dwbc
dx
=
@wbc
@x
+
@wbc
@l
@l
@x
> 0
dwbc
dn
=
@wbc
@n
+
@wbc
@l
@l
@n
> 0:
As:
@wbc
@n
=
xl (1  l) (1  x)
( x  l + xl + nxl + 1)2
> 0 (9)
@wbc
@x
=
nl (1  l)
( x  l + xl + nxl + 1)2
> 0
@wbc
@l
=
nx(1  x)
( x  l + xl + nxl + 1)2
> 0;
we need to evaluate the sign of @l
@x
and @l
@n
in order to evaluate the above conditions. We begin by the latter. It is possible
to show with examples that @l
@n
can take any sign. Consider, for example, the case with x = 0:05. When n increases from
499 to 500, l increases 0:016 whereas when n increases from 500 to 501, l decreases 0:016. This implies that property (v )
may or may not be present if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary, depending on the number of shareholders and the
corresponding subsets in which each shareholder is pivotal. We now address the former. As @((1=2 x)n=(1 x))
@x
=   n
2(1 x)2 < 0
and @(n=2(1 x))
@x
= n
2(1 x)2 > 0, the number of terms in the summation term that determines the number of subsets in which
the horizontal shareholder is pivotal cannot decrease with x. We now consider the e¤ect of x in the number of subsets in which
any small shareholder is pivotal, starting with Cn 1j
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
k. By construction, Cn 1p increases in p until p = (n 1)=2 and then
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decreases. As (n 1)=2 (1=2 x)n
(1 x) =
x(n+1) 1
2(1 x) > 0 for all x (otherwise, the horizontal shareholder is smaller than the others), we
can conclude that increasing x may maintain or decrease
j
( 1
2
  x) n
1 x
k
, which never increases Cn 1
( 1
2
 x) n
1 x
. We now turn to
Cn 1n
2(1 x)
. As (n 1)
2
  n
2(1 x) =  nx+1 x2(1 x) < 0 for all x, increasing x may maintain or increase
j
n
2(1 x)
k
which never increases
Cn 1j
n
2(1 x)
k. This implies that increases in x cannot lead to a decrease in the Banzhaf power index and, hence, cannot decrease
wbc. This implies that property (v ) is present if the number of shareholders of a rm is xed.
We now examine the proposed alternative formulation. Under proportional control, the weight that each manager assigns to
the prot of the rival rm is given by x, which increases in x and does not vary in n. This implies that property (v ) is present
if the number of shareholders is xed while it is not present if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary. Under Banzhaf
control, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm is given by l. As discussed in the O&Ss formulation
section above, this may decrease with n but never decreases with x. This implies that property (v ) is present if the number of
shareholders is xed while it may be present or not if the number of shareholders is allowed to vary, depending on the number
of shareholders and the corresponding subsets in which each shareholder is pivotal.
Property (vi).
Under proportional control, the di¤erence in weights that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm between O&Ss
formulation and our proposed alternative formulation is given by:
x2
x2 +
(1 x)2
n
  x = x (1  x) x (n+ 1)  1
x2 (n+ 1)  2x+ 1 : (10)
As x2 (n+ 1)  2x+ 1 > x2   2x+ 1 = (1  x)2 > 0 this is always positive, meaning the weights that each manager assigns to
the prot of the rival rm are lower under the proposed alternative formulation than under O&Ss formulation. Moreover, the
weight that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm under O&Ss formulation tends to one, for any given value of
the horizontal shareholders control rights x, as n!1. In contrast, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot of the
rival rm under the proposed alternative formulation, solely tends to one when x tends to one.
Under Banzhaf control, the di¤erence in weights that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm between O&Ss
formulation and our proposed alternative formulation is given by:
lx
lx+
(1 l)(1 x)
n
  l =
l (1  l) (x (n+ 1)  1)
l (x (n+ 1)  1) + 1  x
> 0; (11)
which is always positive, meaning the weights that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm are lower under the
proposed alternative formulation than under O&Ss formulation. Moreover, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot
of the rival rm under O&Ss formulation tends to one, for any given value of the horizontal shareholders control rights l,
as n ! 1. In contrast, the weight that each manager assigns to the prot of the rival rm under the proposed alternative
formulation, solely tends to one when l tends to one.
Online Appendix B
In this appendix, we present the proof of Proposition 1. We divide it in two. We rst present the proof under Assumptions 1,
2a, 3, 4 and 5. We then present the proof under Assumptions 1, 2b, 3, 4 and 5. To do so, let xaj and xbj denote the strategy
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proposals of the incumbent and the challenger for rm j, respectively and let x = (x1; : : : ; xj ; : : : ; xN )
> denote the N  1
vector of strategy proposals for all the rms in the industry. Further, let mj 2 faj ; bjg denote the identity of the candidate
that receives the majority of rm js voting rights (being elected manager of the rm) and let m = (m1; : : : ;mj ; : : : ;mN )
>
denote the N  1 vector of elected managers for all the rms in the industry. Finally, let uk (x;m) and Rk (x) express the
mathematical dependence of the utility and return of shareholder k, respectively, on the winning strategies of all rms.
Proof of Proposition 1 under Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, 4 and 5.
Assumption 2a implies that candidates choose strategy proposals so to maximize the product of the probability that they
are elected in the second stage and the utility obtained from the rent associated with corporate o¢ ce they expect to accrue
conditional upon being elected, which we denote . Since the maximization problem of the two candidates to rm j is symmetric,
we describe - for simplicity of exposition - solely the incumbents problem, who chooses xaj so to solve:
max
xaj
Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) ; (12)
where xa = (x1; : : : ; xaj ; : : : ; xN )
>, xb =
 
x1; : : : ; xbj ; : : : ; xN
> and Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) denotes the probability with which
the incumbent is, from the candidates perspective, elected manager of the rm in the second stage.
In order to solve the above maximization problem, we must beforehand derive Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb). To do so, let `j denote the
number of shareholders with voting rights in rm j, }j denote all the 2`j 1 possible subsets of those shareholders that can award
the majority of votes to a candidate and {j 2 }j denote a particular subset of those shareholders. Given that the incumbents
election is ensured with the votes of all shareholders in each subset in }j , we have that the probability Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) with
which she is elected manager of rm j just sums the probabilities Pr

mj = aj jxa;xb;{j

with which she is elected in each
subset {j , as follows:
Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) =
X
{j2}j
Pr
 
mj = aj jxa;xb;{j

(13)
=
X
{j2}j
Y
k2{j
Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
Y
k=2{j
Prkbj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
=
X
{j2}j
Y
k2{j
Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
Y
k=2{j

1  Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)

;
wherema = (m1; : : : ; aj ; : : : ;mN )
> andmb = (m1; : : : ; bj ; : : : ;mN )> while Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) and Prkbj (xa;ma;xb;mb) =
1  Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) denote the probability that shareholder k votes for the incumbent and the challenger, respectively.
It remains to derive Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb), which is given by:
Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) = Pr (uk (xa;ma) > uk (xb;mb)) (14)
= Pr
 
Rk (xa) > Rk (xb) + jg

= Pr
 
jg < Rk (xa) Rk (xb)

= Gkj (Rk (xa) Rk (xb))
=
1
2
+
1
jkj
(Rk (xa) Rk (xb)) ;
where the second equality makes use of the fact that the term
P
g2=nj dgkg enters the utility obtained from both strategy
proposals and the last equality makes use of Assumption 5. This implies that we can rewrite the incumbents problem as follows:
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max
xaj
$aj =
X
{j2}j
Y
k2{j
Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
Y
k=2{j

1  Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)

: (15)
Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 imply that this problem is strictly concave conditional on rival rm strategies and therefore has a
unique maximum. In order to see why note that, under Assumption 1, shareholders are conditionally sincere, which implies
that the incumbent candidate to rm j can choose her strategy proposal taking the strategies of the candidates to the remaining
rms as given. The rst order condition of this problem is, thus, given by:
@$aj
@xaj
=
X
k2
@ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@xaj
; (16)
where, using probability (13), we have that:
@ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
=
X
{j2}j ;k2{j
Y
h2{j ;h6=k
Prhaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
Y
h=2{j

1  Prhaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)

(17)
 
X
{j2}j ;k=2{j
Y
h2{j
Prhaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
Y
h=2{j ;h6=k

1  Prhaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)

;
which (i ) is, by denition, non-negative since increasing Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) for any k can not have a negative impact on
Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb); and (ii ) does not depend on Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) since Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) is linear in Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
for any k taking the corresponding probabilities of the remaining shareholders as given. The second order condition of the in-
cumbents problem, in turn, is given by:
@2$aj
@x2aj
=
X
k2j
@2 Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) @xaj
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@xaj
(18)
+
X
k2j
@ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@2 Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@x2aj
=
X
k2j
@2 Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
2
 
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@xaj
!2
+
X
k2j
@ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@2 Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@x2aj
=
X
k2j
@ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb)
@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@2 Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)
@x2aj
;
where the last equality makes use of the fact that @2 Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) =@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb)2 = 0 for all k, since it
does not depend on Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb). Using probability (13), we have that the objective function of the manager
is strictly concave in xaj , conditional on the strategies of the remaining rms, since (i ) @2 Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) =@x
2
aj = 
1=jkj

@2Rk (xa) =@x
2
aj is negative under Assumption 4; and (ii ) @ Pr (mj = aj jxa;xb) =@ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) > 0 for at
least an shareholder k. Finally, given that the strategy proposal xaj is, under Assumption 3, dened in a convex set, we have
that the incumbents maximization problem has an unique maximum.
Given the symmetry of the maximization problem of the challenger candidate to rm j, we have that the two candidates
will choose the same best-response function, i.e., the same strategy proposal for the rm, conditional on the strategies of the
candidates to the remaining rms. We now show that this best-response function is the same as the best-response function
that arises while maximizing a weighted average of the relative returns of the rms shareholders conditional on the strategies
of the candidates to the remaining rms, with normalized Banzhaf power indices as weights. To do so, note that since the
two candidates will choose the same best-response function, in equilibrium, we have Rk(xa) = Rk(xb) = Rk(x) for all k. This
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implies that the rst-order condition reduces to:
1
2`j 1
X
{j2}j
X
k2{j
1
jkj
@Rk (x)
@xj
  1
2`j 1
X
{j2}j
X
k=2{j
1
jkj
@Rk (x)
@xj
7 0; (19)
which makes use of the fact that @ Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) =@xaj =
 
1=jkj

@Rk (xa) =@xaj and Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) =
Prkbj (xa;ma;xb;mb) = 1=2 when xa = xb, both for all k. This rst-order condition can, in turn, be rewritten as:
1
2`j 1
X
k2j
 
jk
1
jkj
@Rk (x)
@xj
 

2`j 1   jk
 1
jkj
@Rk (x)
@xj
!
7 0; (20)
where jk denotes the number of subsets in }j in which shareholder k enters and
 
2`j 1   jk

denotes the number of subsets
in }j in which shareholder k does not enter. Finally, consider that jk can be divided in two terms: the number of subsets in
}j in which shareholder k enters and is pivotal, 
p
jk, and the number of subsets in }j in which shareholder k enters and is not
pivotal, ~pjk.
9 The latter is, by construction, equal to the number of subsets in }j in which shareholder k does not enter. This
implies that ~pjk =
 
2`j 1   jk

and that the rst-order condition can be rewritten as:
X
k2j
 
pjk
2`j 1
!
1
jkj
@Rk (x)
@xj
7 0; (21)
where pjk=2
`j 1 denotes the Banzhaf power index associated to shareholder k in rm j. This establishes that, in equilibrium,
the candidates to each rm converge to the same strategy, which also maximizes the following weighted average of the relative
returns of the shareholders with voting rights in the rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining rms:
max
xj
X
k2j
kj
~Rk (x) ; (22)
where kj =

pjk=2
`j 1

=
P
k2

pjk=2
`j 1

= pjk=
P
k2 
p
jk denotes the weight assigned by rm js manager to the
return of shareholder k, measured by the normalized Banzhaf power index of shareholder k in rm j.
Finally, given that the strategy proposal of each candidate to the di¤erent rms is, under Assumption 3, dened in a convex
set and Rk(x) is, under Assumption 4, continuous, the best-response functions of the candidates to the di¤erent rms are
guaranteed to be upper-hemicontinuous, which implies that we can apply Kakutanis xed point theorem to ensure that the
Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 1 under Assumptions 1, 2b, 3, 4 and 5.
Assumption 2b implies that candidates choose strategy proposals so to maximize the sum, across all shareholders, of the
product of the probability that each shareholder votes for the candidate by the corresponding voting rights. Again, since the
maximization problem of the two candidates to rm j is symmetric, we describe - for simplicity of exposition - solely the
incumbents problem, who chooses xaj so to solve:
max
xaj
X
k2j
Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) kj =
X
k2j
 
1
2
+
 
1
jkj
!
(Rk (xa) Rk (xb))
!
kj ; (23)
where, under Assumption 5, Prkaj (xa;ma;xb;mb) = (1=2) +
 
1=jkj

(Rk (xa) Rk (xb)) denotes, as discussed above, the
9
Shareholder k is p ivotal if for som e subset {j which does not include shareholder k, we have
P
h2{
j
hj  0:5, but if we include shareholder
k,
P
h2{
j
hj > 0:5.
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probability that shareholder k votes for the incumbent.
Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 imply that this problem is strictly concave conditional on rival rm strategies and therefore has a
unique maximum. In order to see why note that, under Assumption 1, shareholders are conditionally sincere, which implies
that the incumbent candidate to rm j can choose her strategy proposal taking the strategies of the candidates to the remaining
rms as given. The rst order condition of this problem is, thus, given by:
@$aj
@xaj
=
X
k2j
1
jkj
@Rk (xa)
@xaj
kj ; (24)
whereas the second order condition is given by:
@2$aj
@x2aj
=
X
k2j
1
jkj
@2Rk (xa)
@x2aj
kj ; (25)
which implies, given Assumption 4, that the objective function of the manager is strictly concave in xaj , conditional on the
strategies of the remaining rms. Finally, given that the strategy proposal xaj is, under Assumption 3, dened in a convex set,
we have that the incumbents maximization problem has an unique maximum.
Given the symmetry of the maximization problem of the challenger candidate to rm j, we have that the two candidates
will choose the same best-response function, i.e., the same strategy proposal for the rm, conditional on the strategies of the
candidates to the remaining rms. This establishes that, in equilibrium, the candidates to each rm converge to the same
strategy, which also maximizes the following weighted average of the relative returns of the shareholders with voting rights in
the rm, conditional on the strategies of the candidates to the remaining rms:
max
xj
X
k2j
kj
~Rk (x) ; (26)
where kj = kj denotes the weight assigned by rm js manager to the return of shareholder k, measured by the voting rights
of shareholder k in rm j.
Finally, given that the strategy proposal of each candidate to the di¤erent rms is, under Assumption 3, dened in a convex
set and Rk(x) is, under Assumption 4, continuous, the best-response functions of the candidates to the di¤erent rms are
guaranteed to be upper-hemicontinuous, which implies that we can apply Kakutanis xed point theorem to ensure that the
Nash equilibrium exists.
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